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Abstract
 The empirical work on the role of trade linkages in the transmission of economic
disturbances has been limited to tests on the significance of variables of simple trade shares of
partners, both bilateral and in common markets. This approach ignores additional elements deriving
from the new open economy macroeconomics, such as country size, the pricing policy of exporters
and the substitutability of exports. It also only considers the “first victim” country as the one
transmitting the crisis to the others, leaving out the action of all other intra-regional links. This paper
bridges this gap by producing theoretically-backed indicators of vulnerability due to trade linkages
in a multilateral setting. These indicators are then used to compare the size of trade linkages in Latin
America and in South-east Asia, two regions that were affected by financial crises in the 1990s.
The proposed indexes show that Latin America is much less vulnerable than Asia to an international
transmission of economic disturbances from a country in the same region. This is due to the
relatively smaller size of Latin American countries, to the higher share of raw materials in their
exports and the lower degree of similarity both of the manufactures exported inside their region and
of those exported to their common industrial markets. Moreover, South-east Asian countries are
more likely than Latin American ones to transmit economic disturbances to industrial countries due
to the higher substitutability of their manufactured exports with those of more advanced economies.
JEL classification: F14, F15.
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1
The study of international transmission mechanisms has attracted a renewed interest after the
wave of currency crises of the 1990s, whose general feature has been their propagation from one
or some countries to whole regions. Financial markets, the banking sector and trade have been
identified as the main ‘culprits’ of the contagion, because of their role as channels linking different
countries.
This paper concentrates on trade linkages as a channel for spreading the effects of currency
crises or, more generally, economic disturbances, from one “source” country to other countries,
and compares the degree of vulnerability to external shocks of five Latin American countries and
five Asian crisis countries by means of theoretically consistent indicators of trade linkages. Although
the linkages through capital and exchange rate markets can be more significant in the short run,
because of the high speed of reaction typical of these markets, trade links, even when they are
smaller in magnitude, may produce more long lasting effects on the “infected” economies.
2 We
consider trade linkages in their two dimensions: structural, i.e. the repercussions on the domestic
economy of a disturbance arising elsewhere due to trade links, and strategic, i.e. the probability of a
devaluation in countries producing exports similar to those of the source country. Indeed, a
government’s decision to devalue the currency as a response to a shock  in a partner country
depends mostly on the dimension of the trade links with the latter.
Available empirical work has identified and measured trade links simply by means of total
export shares, either bilateral or in common markets. The recent wave of theory on the effects of
                                                                
1 Grateful thanks to G.  Corsetti and all the economists of the International Division of the Research
Department of the Bank of Italy for helpful comments and stimulating discussions. This paper is part of a
research group of the International Division of the Research Department of the Bank of Italy on “The
international transmission of crises”. The views expressed in this paper are the authors’, and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Bank of Italy.
 E-mail:bentivogli.chiara@insedia.interbusiness.it,  monti.paola@insedia.interbusiness.it.
2  Other members of the research group of the International Division of the Research Department of the
Bank of Italy on “The international transmission of crises” have worked on these topics. See Corsetti et al.
(2000b, 2001), Sbracia and Zaghini (2001), Zaghini (2000). Another interesting link that would deserve further
investigation is the connection between the credit market and trade (see, for example,  Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997). In what follows we use  the term contagion as a synonym for transmission.10
devaluation of one currency on countries linked through trade has suggested many refinements to
this standard approach.
In what follows we use the theoretical results of the more recent open macroeconomics
models to develop consistent indicators of trade links. In our view, these additional indicators are
better suited than those used up to now to assess the extent to which trade has played and might
play a role in transmitting economic disturbances within a region.
Our analysis uses a Centre-Periphery framework
3 that assumes a devaluation in country A of
the Periphery as a specific disturbance and examines how it affects another country B in the same
area, via direct trade links or trade competition in the Centre country C. Such a framework reveals
the following key factors in explaining the type and the relevance of transmission effects: country
and region size, degree of trade integration within the region and of competition in third markets,
product composition of trade, pricing policies of exporters (local currency pricing versus seller’s
foreign currency pricing, for example).
4 In our analysis the Periphery consists of a group of
geographically close countries, and we interpret the pattern of interactions that the model identifies
for Periphery countries as a possible description of the kind of interdependencies existing among
geographically close countries. This assumption is consistent with the fact that contagion has
displayed regional features.
5
We seek to compare and explain the vulnerability to economic disturbances arising in a
neighbour country for the two main regional emerging markets groups that were affected by
financial crises in the 1990s: Latin America and Asia. We therefore construct trade indicators for
five major Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela) and five
Asian countries affected by the currency crisis in 1997-98 (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand) and we use them to assess how some specific features of their trade
                                                                
3  See Corsetti et al. (2000a), Gerlach and Smets (1995).
4  For a more detailed survey of this kind of model in the context of contagion through trade, see Bentivogli
and Monti (2000).
5  Geographical proximity is considered here only as a factor strengthening trade links; in fact it can also
summarise other linkages among countries: common institutional settings, common culture, etc.11
structure could affect the ex-ante vulnerability of the countries in each area. We also compare our
results with those deriving from the indexes used in the previous empirical work on contagion.
The indexes we calculate tend to show that Latin American countries are much less
vulnerable than South-east Asian ones to an economic disturbance  arising in a country in the same
region. This is due to many factors. A first group of factors, mentioned in the literature, is related to
a region’s size and the extent of bilateral trade and  competition in common markets. Indeed,
although Latin American economies as a whole are bigger in terms of their share of world output,
they are less open than Asia to international trade. Moreover, intra-regional trade shares are bigger
for Asian countries, which also compete more strongly in several industrial markets.
A second group of factors that our indicators emphasise is related to the structure of trade.
First, the share of exports in Latin American manufactures is smaller than that in Asian economies.
This implies that, in the case of a devaluation of a regional member in Latin America, the degree of
pass-through is rather limited and hence the trade channel is less active. The limited evidence shows
that the pass-through is higher in Asian countries for manufactures, too, due to the fact that export
prices are mostly fixed in their national currencies, while in Latin America exports and imports are
mostly invoiced in dollars. Second, considering manufactures only, Latin American countries appear
to be less vulnerable due to the lower degree of similarity of their export structure. A simple
comparison of Glick and Rose indexes of total trade, heretofore the most widely used in empirical
analysis, and the same indicators calculated for manufactures only, show that the indications change
markedly, with the former showing higher bilateral links and lower competition in common markets
than the latter.
Another dimension of trade structure which is relevant in assessing a country’s impact from
transmission through trade is product substitutability, since it determines the size and the direction of
the demand switching effects. In order to measure product substitutability we compute export
similarity indexes, both bilateral and in three common external markets, the United States, the
European Union and Japan. For trade in manufactures, the bilateral indexes show a higher degree
of similarity among the Asian crisis countries than among Latin American ones. Interestingly,
Mexico’s trade structure is much more in line with that of Korea and Thailand than with any country12
in its region. This results are confirmed by the indexes computed for trade in the three common
markets. Moreover, this second group of similarity indexes contributes with some caveats to the
indications given by the simple export shares in common markets computed in the first part of the
paper. In particular, even if the United States is the most relevant common market, in terms of total
export shares, for most of the countries analysed, some Latin American countries have a higher
similarity index in their exports to the European Union. Similarly, Japan appears to be a significant
centre of transmission, having, for some Asian countries, indexes higher than those for the United
States.
A limitation of the similarity indexes is that they are symmetric so that they can be quite
misleading if considered alone as a measure of the degree of transmission of economic disturbances
through trade. This is clearly unrealistic, and is due to the fact that the similarity index does not take
into account the other factors mentioned by the theory as relevant in measuring the dimension of the
trade channel, such as relative size and relative trade shares.
This shows once again that no single factor can be considered by itself as determining the
extent of the trade transmission mechanism. As the theory emphasises, a complete picture of trade
linkages among countries can be given only by the plurality of indicators we present here.
In conclusion, the empirical analysis suggests that trade can play a greater role in transmitting
economic disturbances among Asian countries than among Latin American ones. It also shows that,
in testing the relative importance of trade and financial channels of transmission, the former should
be captured by a more comprehensive and sophisticated set of indicators than has been used in the
empirical literature so far.
The paper is organised as follows: in section 2 we derive  some indications on the relevant
factors that help to evaluate the degree of a country’s vulnerability to the transmission of economic
disturbances through trade; section 3 summarises the indicators used in previous work, discusses
their consistency with the theoretical results, and defines the characteristics that an informative index
should have; in section 4 we discuss the results arising from our indexes and compare them with
earlier  work.13
2. The theory of crisis transmission via trade links
Does more trade interdependence bring about a higher risk of transmission of economic
disturbances? Intuitively, since trade is a channel linking countries’ production, consumption, and
investment, yes may seem the obvious answer. The stronger trade links are, the more likely it is that
disturbances arising in one country will be transmitted to its trade partners. The theory developed
during the last wave of currency crises shows that this is not always the case and that, even when
this broad conclusion applies, it must be qualified.
According to the theory, the relevant factors to assess the likelihood of transmission of a
crisis through trade are:
i)  the size of the ‘ground zero’ country, that is the country where the economic
disturbance took place first;
ii)  the extent of bilateral/regional trade;
iii)  the degree of competition in third markets;
iv)  the degree of exchange rate pass-through;
v)  the degree of product substitutability.
Most of these factors are interrelated. For example, the extent of pass-through depends,
among other things, on product substitutability. However in what follows we will discuss each of
them separately.
2.1 Country size and openness
Country size is relevant in assessing  the extent to which the trade channel will operate for
two reasons. First, the larger the size of the ‘ground zero’ country, the greater, other things being
equal, the systemic effects of a shock on other countries or areas via trade links. Second, the
Corsetti et al. (2000a) Centre-Periphery model suggests that the larger the size of a region, the
stronger will be the incentive for a trade partner belonging to that region to match the devaluation of
a country in the same region. The theory assumes GDP, world population and world trade shares14
are coincident in equilibrium.
6 In reality, these shares can differ substantially, due to different
degrees of trade openness. In this case, the most relevant indicator in assessing the magnitude of the
impact is the trade share. Indeed, shocks arising in large GDP countries may have small
repercussions in the world when their trade share is low.
7
Latin America as a region represents 8.6 per cent of world output (measured at current
PPPs) and 5.4 per cent of world trade at current prices (Table 1). It is smaller than emerging and
developing Asia, which represents 16 per cent of world output and 9.9 per cent of world trade.
8
The five major Latin American countries’ share of world output stands at 6.6 per cent at current
PPPs, that of the Asian crisis countries at 5.1. However, the five Latin American countries have a
slightly smaller share of world trade than the Asian crisis economies.
A broad inspection of the evolution of the degree of openness confirms these observations
(Figures 1 and 2). On average, the five major Latin American countries are less open than the
Asian crisis countries. A notable exception is Chile, whose degree of openness in the nineties was
comparable to that of Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. Argentina and Brazil’s degrees of
openness were among the lowest in the region, at somewhat less than 30 per cent.
If one had to interpret this preliminary evidence in terms of systemic risk, one could conclude
that, on average, Asian countries appear to be riskier than Latin American ones.
2.2 Extent of bilateral and intra-regional trade
Another factor that determines a country exposure to an international transmission of
economic disturbances is the geographical direction of its trade, in particular with countries in the
same region.
                                                                
6  See Corsetti et al. (2000a). In fact, the authors define size only in terms of share of world output, but in
their model all goods are traded internationally, therefore implying very open countries.
7  This is the case, for example, for China, which accounts for 10.2 per cent of world GDP but for only 3.4
per cent of world trade since it is a very closed economy.
8  Here and in the rest of the paper emerging and developing Asia includes developing Pacific countries,
Singapore and Hong Kong and excludes South Asia.15
Traditionally, strong intra-regional or bilateral trade links have been considered an element of
vulnerability, due to the negative demand switching effects of a devaluation by a competitor. More
recent contributions have emphasised the positive effects of the improvement in the terms of trade
of the partner of the devaluing country. In particular, in the case of full pass-through,
9 a devaluation
in country A causes an improvement in country B’s terms of trade vis-à-vis A, with positive effects
on B’s welfare directly related to its trade share with A.
The intra-group trade of the five major Latin American countries is low (10.7 per cent), but it
rises to 18.6 per cent when considering trade with the whole Latin American region. Intra-group
trade for the Asian crisis countries is even lower (8.9 per cent), possibly due to the role of Hong
Kong and Singapore as re-export hubs in East Asia, but it is quite high for trade with the whole
Asian region (37.1 per cent; Table 2).
10
Among the five major Latin American countries, intra-regional trade share is heterogeneous,
with the highest share for Argentina (37.3 per cent) and the lowest for Mexico (2.2 per cent).
Argentina is also the most “dependent” on exports to regional countries, with Brazil as its most
important export market within the area, with a bilateral export share of 27.8 per cent. Mexico, by
contrast, does not appear among its first 15 export markets (Table 3). Brazil and Chile send 25.4
and 20.5 per cent of total exports, respectively, to the Latin American region. The single most
important regional market for Brazil is Argentina, with a share of 11.5 per cent.
The Asian crisis countries show a more homogeneous degree of intra-group and intra-
regional integration. Many Asian countries appear among their main export markets. Singapore and
Hong Kong are among the leading outlets for each Asian crisis country. Given the role of Hong
Kong as re-export market, the fact that 75 per cent of its exports to Asia are actually directed to
China shows that the five Asian crisis countries are actually more integrated with China than
                                                                
9  With full pass-through we refer to a situation in which, in the short run, prices are set in the currency of
the producing countries, so that any exchange rate movement of that currency will fully pass through to the
prices of the importing country.
10  We computed export shares as five-year averages (1995-99) in order to remove short-term variability.16
appears in the data. Similar considerations also apply to Singapore for exports to China and
Malaysia.
Summing up, the share of intra-regional trade is lower for Latin American countries as a
whole. Argentina appears to be the most vulnerable to regional shocks, having two Latin American
countries as its first and third main export markets, with a cumulative share of about 35 per cent.
2.3 Competition in third markets
Trade links operate not only bilaterally, but also through competition in common markets. A
devaluation in country A, in the presence of some degree of pass-through, leads to an improvement
in its competitiveness and to an increase in its exports vis-à-vis other competitors (B) in common
markets.
11 Thus, competition in third markets can exert a negative effect on partner countries. This
might indeed  be the case of Latin American countries competing for market share in the US
market.
Table 3 lists the first 15 export markets for each of the five major Latin American countries
and the Asian crisis countries. It confirms that the United States is the main export market for all of
them, though with shares ranging from 16.8 to 84.9 per cent. Argentina is an exception, with the
United States following Brazil in the second place, but with a significantly smaller share (about 8 per
cent). The United States is also the main common market for the Asian crisis countries except
Indonesia, with Japan following as an important outlet. If we consider the European Union countries
as a group, then while the United States remains the most important market for Mexico and
Venezuela, the European Union becomes the leading export market for Chile and Brazil, and the
second after Brazil for Argentina. For the Asian crisis countries, the European Union is always the
second most important market (the third for Malaysia, after Singapore).
Again considering the European Union as a group, Japan is the third export market for Chile,
with a share of 15.5 per cent; it is the fourth and fifth respectively for Mexico and Brazil and has
                                                                
11  This is true under quite general conditions, that is when A’s and B’s goods are very similar, but the
elasticity of substitution between Centre and Periphery goods is low. See Corsetti et al. (2000a).17
more modest importance for Argentina and Venezuela. For Asian crisis countries, Japan is the most
important market for Indonesia, but it follows the United States and the European Union for all the
other countries.
Summing up, for both groups of countries considered, competition in common markets takes
place in the industrial area and it is particularly strong in the United States and the European Union.
The importance of these markets for each Latin American country is nevertheless very different and
in some cases trade is very polarized (Mexico and Venezuela). For the Asian crisis countries the
relevance of these common markets is very similar both between them and within each country.
2.4 Exchange rate pass-through
A fundamental issue in assessing the relevance of trade as a transmission channel is the
degree to which exchange rate changes are passed through to prices. The standard Keynesian view
is that, in the short run, prices are fixed in the sellers’ currencies, so that any movement in the
exchange rate of a given country is fully transmitted to its import prices, while its export prices do
not change. This means that devaluations involve deteriorations in its terms of trade.
12 In this case,
more trade between A and B reduces the risk of negative repercussions on B from a devaluation of
A, because the improvement in B’s terms of trade compensates for the decline in B’s export
volumes. Completely different implications can be drawn in models that assume local currency
pricing. In this case, the devaluing country actually experiences an improvement in its terms of trade,
while its competitive position is not affected. This situation increases the incentive of partner
countries to match the devaluation.
The degree of pass-through is strongly influenced by the commodity structure of trade, and in
particular by the share of manufactures in total trade. This is due to the fact that raw materials prices
are generally set in dollars internationally. Therefore, except for the United States, raw materials
trade is likely to be affected mostly by global commodity price changes rather than a country’s
exchange rate changes. This implies that changes in the exchange rate of a commodity exporter will
                                                                
12  Terms of trade are defined here as the ratio between the prices of exports and those of imports.18
not affect its competitiveness and, probably, its terms of trade. This suggests that the analysis of
vulnerability should only consider trade in manufactures, for which the pricing behaviour of
producers may lead to a devaluation having a very different effect on the terms of trade and
competitiveness.
The actual behaviour of the terms of trade in response to exchange rate movements is a
matter of empirical investigation. A preliminary examination of manufactures’ terms of trade for
Mexico and Korea, for which OECD data are available, shows a negative correlation between
exchange rate and terms of trade changes in both cases. This can be interpreted as supporting
evidence for the Keynesian view. Considering the corresponding recent crisis period for each of
them, the correlations are  very different in size however: -0.06 for  Mexico and -0.49 for Korea.
While the results for Korea are very similar to those estimated for industrial countries,
13 Mexico
looks like an outlier. A possible explanation is that Mexican exports are heavily concentrated on the
US market, where  the invoice currency is usually the US dollar; at the same time Mexican
manufacturing imports are mainly from the United States, and it is very unlikely that US firms set
their prices in pesos rather than dollars. This asymmetry in the behaviour of Mexican and US firms,
mainly related to the different structure and size of the two markets, can explain the very low
(negative) correlation between the exchange rate and the terms of trade observed for Mexico.
This in turn implies that Mexican devaluations would have, other things being equal, low spill-
over effects in the Latin American region.
2.5 Product substitutability
The degree of substitutability of the different internationally-traded goods is relevant in
assessing a country’s impact from transmission because it determines the size and the direction of
the demand switching effects.
For example, when countries of the same region produce goods that are very
similar/substitutes in consumption, then changes in the exchange rate of  one of them may
                                                                
13   See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999).19
significantly reduce the welfare of its regional trading partners due to the sharp reduction in the
demand for their exports.
Substitutability in production also matters and may have different effects from that in
consumption. For example, if trade within a region consists mainly of products that are
complementary in production, then a devaluation by one country improves the competitiveness of
the “joint product” for all countries in the region.
For the substitution effects to occur, some degree of pass-through must take place. This
implies that, as noted previously, the analysis of substitution effects applies mainly to countries
producing manufactures.
The direction and magnitude of the demand switching effects, as summarised by the degree
of pass-through together with the price elasticities of substitution between goods, have been greatly
emphasised in the theory but have been underestimated in the empirical analysis. We intend to fill
this gap by presenting some trade indicators that take these theoretical suggestions into account.
3. Testing vulnerability due to trade links: Glick and Rose trade indexes
Following the currency crises of the 1990s, numerous empirical tests of the relevance of
trade as a transmission channel have been conducted. Nevertheless, the methodologies used only
partially take the theoretical results set out in the preceding sections into account. In particular, they
measure trade links between countries simply by using various combinations of total trade shares
and neglect the commodity composition of trade.
Glick and Rose (1998) trade indexes have been used most extensively in these empirical
tests.
14 They compute the following indicators:
                                                                
14  For other interesting empirical works testing the relevance of trade as a transmission mechanism see
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where xik are exports from country i to country k (k „ i, 0), 0 is the “first victim” country, x 0 are
total exports of country 0 and xi are total exports of country i. Trade is an indicator of the
contribution of third markets for the first victim country and for country i, DirectTrade is a measure
of bilateral trade, TotalTrade is a weighted index of bilateral trade and trade in common markets,
and TradeShare is an index similar to Trade but adjusted for trade shares to control for the different
size of the countries. Using these indexes to estimate contagion regressions, Glick and Rose (1998)
find strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis that currency crises spread from one country to
another because of trade.
15 Moreover their results are relatively insensitive to the exact index used.
These and similar indexes used in empirical estimates of transmission of crises, do not fully
exploit the insights of the theory we discussed previously.
16 In particular, while they emphasise the
direction of trade, they do not at all measure the product composition of exports, thus overlooking
                                                                
15  His finding does not seem to be robust to alternative specifications of contagion regressions. For
example, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999), add variables to the regression that measure the competition for
bank funds in the first crisis country and that take a form similar to, alternatively, the Trade and Tradeshare
indexes of Glick and Rose (1998), with bank lending instead of trade. With this specification, they find that trade
is much less significant than competition for funds as a channel of transmission. For Asian countries  trade is
found to be not significant at all.
16  In addition, they might convey distorted indications. As Caramazza et al. (1999) note, with almost
balanced trade, for example, the DirectTrade measure hints at a very large link even if the bilateral flows are very
small.21
the role of product substitutability and the (likely) degree of pass-through. Besides, for each crisis
episode, these indexes are computed with reference to a “ground zero” or “first victim” country that
is assumed to be the only one transmitting the crisis to the others in the region. In our view, this is a
limitation for two main reasons. First, because the country where the crisis breaks out might well be
the one where the symptoms are felt at a later stage. Second, because once the crisis has started, it
is the whole intra-regional trade network that is relevant as a transmission channel, not only the first
victim’s trade structure.
As a first step to include the product composition of trade, we computed Glick and Rose
(1998) TradeShare (measuring competition in third markets) and DirectTrade (measuring direct
trade linkages) indexes for the five major Latin America economies, the Asian crisis countries and
the G7, both for total trade and for trade in manufactures only. Note that our measures of total
trade linkages are not identical to those computed by Glick and Rose because we use a different
data set  and we consider different countries.
17
Table 5 shows that when the two indexes are computed for total trade and trade in
manufactures, they do not change much for G7 countries, given the high manufactures content of
their trade; by contrast, they differ substantially for other areas.
Let’s consider Latin America and indexes computed for the 1994 crisis, assuming Mexico as
the “ground zero” country. Trade links in manufactures come out lower than those measured on
total trade for bilateral links (direct trade), while they are higher for links in common markets. A
possible explanation is that, although Latin America trade has a high raw materials content,
competition with Mexico in third markets is mostly in manufactures. Only for Venezuela, an oil
exporter like Mexico, do trade links in third markets decrease strongly when only manufactures are
considered. Oil price shocks would affect both of them equally and, since oil is quoted in dollars
internationally, a devaluation of the Mexican peso (which is what we are interested in) would not
change their relative competitive position in oil markets. Similar results hold for the 1997 crisis: the
                                                                
17  We use the WTA Statistics Canada database, while  Glick and Rose use IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics. For the list of third markets considered, see Appendix I.22
direct trade index in manufactures is much lower for Korea and Philippines; the one measuring
competition in third markets is higher for all the Asian crisis countries except the Philippines.
This simple exercise suggests that, for the two regions analysed here, considering total trade
instead of manufactures only in the construction of trade indicators implies very different results: the
first group of indexes show higher bilateral links and lower competition in common markets than the
second. This confirms that taking the structure of trade into account has important implications for
the assessment of the vulnerability of a country to a crisis.
4. Indicators of vulnerability linked to trade structure
Our first extension tries to overcome the limitation of considering only the “first victim”
country as a partner. We therefore compute indexes of the commodity specialisation of each
country’s exports by using the world average as a benchmark. Tables 6 and 7 contain the
specialisation indexes for each of the five Latin American countries and the five Asian crisis
countries. We consider the export specialisation of each country both in the total world market and
in some specific countries or areas, including the regions of which our countries are part. The
indexes are calculated as
SIij = (x
a
ij / xij) / (x
a
wj / xwj) * 100
where the numerator is the export share of each country  i of commodity group a to area of
destination j; the denominator is the corresponding world share. The index is equal to 100 when the
country trade structure is similar to the world average, and it is greater (lower) than 100 when the
country trade share in commodity a to the specific region j is greater (lower) than the world share.
The specialisation indexes show that, in general, Latin American countries are specialised in
food, metals and fuels; only Mexico's trade share of manufactures is near the world average. Asian
crisis countries have, with the exception of Korea, a marked specialisation in agricultural raw
materials, but they also score high in manufactures trade.
Considering only manufactures, for the Latin American countries the index shows, with the
exception of Mexico, higher relative specialisation inside the region than in the world markets, while23
for the Asian crisis countries intra-regional trade specialisation is similar to their total trade
specialisation. This would suggest that, controlling for other factors (like transport costs), for the
Latin American countries the trade channel operates more strongly within the region than between
the region and the rest of the world, whereas for the Asian crisis countries the trade channel
operates broadly with the same intensity both inside and outside the region. This is an indication that
economic disturbances arising in Asian crisis countries are more likely to be transmitted outside the
region than those starting in Latin America.
Some interesting features emerge when we look at the relative specialisation in the main
common external markets: the United States, the European Union and Japan. With the exception of
Venezuela, Latin American countries’ relative specialisation in manufacturing is much higher in the
United States than in the European Union and in Japan, where trade remains specialised in primary
products. This result qualifies the data we presented in section 2.3: even if Latin American countries
have a high share of total trade directed to the European Union, if one looks at specialisation in
manufacturing the United States appears to be far more relevant as a third market from which
economic disturbances arising in one Latin American country can be transmitted to others. More
heterogeneity emerges for the Asian crisis countries, where in some cases the specialisation index
for manufactures is higher in the Japanese market than in the United States. This shows that Japan
plays an important role in the transmission of crises throughout Asia even for countries for which it
is not the largest market in terms of exports shares.
Summing up, the specialisation indexes indicate that the Asian crisis countries might prove
more sensitive to economic disturbances arising in trade partners due to their higher specialisation in
manufactures. Moreover, a change in Asian competitiveness may have stronger effects on industrial
countries than a similar change in Latin America, where crises are likely to be more regional in
nature.
Though it is a step forward in comparison to simple trade shares indicators, the specialisation
index has a major limitation: the very low differentiation in the product group. Considering
manufactures as a single group hampers an assessment of the degree of substitutability between the
goods traded and thus of the demand switching effects following a change in the terms of trade.24
Table 8 gives a first insight in this direction. It lists the first ten 3-digit SITC commodities
exported by each of the five major Latin American countries and the five Asian crisis countries and
gives an indication of the degree of ‘world market’ power
18 for each product. The national export
shares of each commodity proxy  the importance for the country of demand switching effects that
could arise from devaluation by a competitor in that specific product market. They show that in
Latin America the only two pairs of countries in the region where a change in the terms of trade in
one of them can determine strong demand switching effects in the other are Mexico and Argentina
(due to competition in passenger vehicles), and Brazil and Mexico (for motor vehicle parts). A very
different picture emerges for the Asian crisis countries, which  compete against each other in
numerous markets.
The shares in the world market can instead be used as a proxy for the impact that changes in
the terms of trade of a specific country could have on its world competitors in those specific
markets. Again, Latin America does not appear to be a big player in any manufactured goods
market: world export shares above 10 per cent can be found only for iron and steel processing for
Brazil and electrical equipment and television receivers for Mexico. The Asian crisis countries,
excluding the Philippines and Thailand, are instead major world exporters in four manufactures
markets.
One way of summarising the substitutability of each country’s exports  is the export similarity
index. It is defined as:
( ) [ ] ES x x ij ai aj
a = * ￿ min , 100
where xai and xaj are export shares of, respectively, country i’s and j’s manufactures exports in
industry a. We used 3-digit SITC data in order to ensure a sufficient level of detail in export
composition. The index ranges between 0 and 100, with 0 indicating complete dissimilarity and 100
identical export composition. This specification of the index gives a synthetic picture of the degree
of substitutability of goods traded between two countries. In terms of the Centre-Periphery model
of Corsetti et al. (2000a), the higher the elasticity of substitution between the goods produced in the
                                                                
18  Measured as a share of a country’s exports of  that commodity in world exports.25
two Periphery countries (A and B), the larger the positive demand switching effect towards the
devaluing country.
19 If the elasticity of substitution among goods produced in one country is higher
than the one across goods produced in each of the two Periphery countries, then after a devaluation
by A the demand switch from B to A exceeds, in terms of welfare effects, the improvement in B’s
terms of trade. Therefore, the higher the similarity index, the more negative the effect transmitted to
B from A through trade.
Table 9 shows the similarity indexes for 1997 for raw materials and for manufactures. A first
indication given by these indexes is that the export structure is generally less homogeneous for raw
materials than for manufactures even for countries in the same region. The only exceptions are
Mexico and Venezuela, both big oil exporters and, among the Asian countries, Malaysia and
Indonesia, which produce a wide range of common raw materials. This means that, for example,
both areas are likely to be affected more by a devaluation by a trade partner exporting
manufactures than by a common shock in a raw material market.
For trade in manufactures, the indexes show a higher degree of similarity among the Asian
crisis countries than among Latin American ones. Among the second group, Argentina and Brazil
are the most similar, with an index of 59.4, while Chile and Venezuela show very low substitutability
indexes. Interestingly, Mexico’s trade structure is much more in line with that of Korea and
Thailand than with any country in its region. This implies that, as far as the trade channel is
concerned, Latin America should be quite well insulated from an economic disturbance arising in
Mexico and vice-versa.
In order to derive a more synthetic measure of the degree of vulnerability of each country, we
averaged its similarity indexes with each of the 81 partner countries we used to compute the Glick
and Rose indexes. We weighted each bilateral similarity index by the world export shares in
manufactures of the partners. The data, shown in the bottom line of Table 9, indicate that Mexico
and Korea, with a similarity index of, respectively, 54 and 53, are the economies for which the
trade transmission channel is most powerful. These levels are quite high, if one considers, for
                                                                
19  Here we are implicitly assuming, as our theoretical reference model does, that all goods produced are
traded.26
example, that the similarity index between Italy and Germany is 67. On the other hand, Venezuela,
Chile, the Philippines and Indonesia appear to be relatively more sheltered from crises starting
elsewhere.
In addition to the similarity between goods produced by each of the two Periphery countries,
the theory finds that it is also important to consider the elasticities of substitution between the goods
produced in the Periphery and those produced in the Centre. After a devaluation by country A and
in the presence of at least partial pass-through, the partner B in the Periphery loses in terms of
welfare if A’s and B’s products are similar and the substitutability between the Periphery’s and the
Centre’s goods is low. This is due to the fact that the increase in the Centre’s demand  for the
Periphery goods will be low and will mainly be directed to country A.
To check the degree of substitutability between goods exported in common markets we
compute the similarity indexes using (instead of total export shares) the export shares of each
country in the three main markets of the areas under analysis: the Unites States, the European Union
and Japan. For all of them the indexes confirm that the similarity among the Asian crisis countries
exports is much higher than that among the five Latin American countries. In each of the three
common markets, only Brazil has significant linkages with the other Latin American countries
(Argentina again appears to be the most closely linked to it). By contrast, all the Asian crisis
countries compete heavily against each other in all the markets (Table 10). In terms of the
theoretical model we refer to, these results indicate that competition in common markets is relevant
for the transmission of crises in both areas and especially for the Asian crisis countries.
The similarity indexes in the three common markets considered contribute, with some
caveats, to the results of section 2.3 on competition in common markets. In particular, even if the
United States is the most relevant common market, in terms of total export shares, for most of the
countries analysed, some Latin American countries have a higher similarity index in their exports to
the European Union. Similarly, Japan appears to be a significant centre of transmission, having, for
some Asian countries, indexes higher than those for the United States.
A limitation of the bilateral similarity indexes showed above is that they are symmetric, so that
they can be quite misleading if considered alone as a measure of the degree of transmission of27
economic disturbances through trade. For example, an economic disturbance arising in Brazil is
supposed to have the same welfare effect on Argentina as a similar disturbance taking place in
Argentina could have on Brazil.  This is clearly unrealistic, and it is due to the fact that the similarity
index does not take  into account the other factors mentioned by the theory as relevant in measuring
the dimension of the trade channel, such as relative size and relative trade shares.
This shows once again that no single factor can be considered by itself as determining the
extent of the trade transmission mechanism. As the theory emphasises, a complete picture of trade
linkages among countries can be given only by the plurality of indicators we present here. The
evaluation of their relative importance is indeed an empirical matter that could be useful to
investigate in future work.28
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Source: World Bank, :RUOG￿’HYHORSPHQW￿,QGLFDWRUV, 2000.













￿￿*￿ 45.8 11.6 48.5 24,841
      United States 21.3 4.6 12.5 29,240
      Canada 1.9 0.5 4.0 22,814
      Japan 8.0 2.1 6.9 23,592
      France 3.4 1.0 5.6 21,214
      Germany 4.9 1.4 10.0 22,026
      Italy 3.2 1.0 4.5 20,365
      United Kingdom 3.3 1.0 5.0 20,314
￿￿/$7,1￿$0(5,&$   8.6 8.5 5.4 6,340
  of which:
  Five major
  Latin American countries   6.6 5.7 4.2 7,347
       Argentina   1.1 0.6 0.5 11,728
       Brazil   2.9 2.8 0.9 6,460
       Chile   0.3 0.3 0.3 8,507
       Mexico   1.9 1.6 2.2 7,450
       Venezuela   0.4 0.4 0.3 5,706
￿￿(0(5*,1*￿$1’
￿￿’(9(/23,1*￿$6,$￿￿￿￿   16.0 30.8 9.9 3,280
  of which:
       China   10.2 21.0 3.4 3,051
￿￿Asian crisis countries   5.1 6.9 6.2 4,640
       Indonesia   1.3 3.5 0.9 2,407
       Korea Rep.   1.7 0.8 2.4 13,286
       Malaysia   0.5 0.4 1.3 7,699
       Philippines   0.8 1.3 0.5 3,725
       Thailand   0.9 1.0 1.0 5,524
Source: World Bank, :RUOG￿’HYHORSPHQW￿,QGLFDWRUV, 2000.
(1) Merchandise exports. – (2) Excludes South Asia and includes Pacific developing countries,














/DWLQ￿$PHULFDQ￿FRXQWULHV 18.6 10.7   5.0   1.8 72.0 13.0 4.4
Argentina 47.5 37.3 10.8   2.9 30.9 18.8 10.8
Brazil 25.4 16.4   8.6   3.5 55.4 27.8 10.6
Chile 20.5 13.1 15.8   7.1 59.9 25.5 3.8
Mexico   5.6   2.2   1.1   0.2 92.8 3.7 0.5
Venezuela 32.5   7.0   0.6   0.2 64.1 8.1 2.8
$VLDQ￿FULVLV￿FRXQWULHV   3.1   1.7 37.1   8.9 52.2 14.5 7.6
Korea   5.8   3.0 35.9   8.1 46.7 12.5 11.6
Indonesia   1.7   1.2 35.5 11.3 57.1 15.4 5.7
Malaysia   1.5   1.0 44.3   9.2 50.3 14.8 3.9
Philippines   1.2   0.4 26.7   8.8 70.3 17.7 1.8
Thailand   1.2   0.8 35.6   7.9 55.7 16.3 7.5
Source: IMF, ’LUHFWLRQ￿RI￿7UDGH￿6WDWLVWLFV.
(1)  Share of each partner country in total exports of each report country. Emerging and developing





%UD]LO 0H[LFR $UJHQWLQD 9HQH]XHOD &KLOH
United States 19.6 United States 84.9 Brazil 27.8 Unites States 51.6 United States 16.8
Argentina 11.5 Canada   2.6 United States   8.3 Colombia   6.7 Japan 15.5
Netherlands   6.3 Japan   1.1 Chile   7.0 Brazil   4.2 United  King.   6.3
Japan   5.6 Spain   0.8 Netherlands   4.5 Dominic. R.   3.3 Brazil   5.5
Germany   5.0 Germany   0.8 Spain   3.2 Canada   2.7 Korea   4.8
Italy   3.5 Brazil   0.7 Italy   3.1 Germany   1.7 Germany   4.4
Belgium   3.2 United King.   0.6 Uruguay   3.0 Peru   1.6 Argentina   4.3
United King.   2.7 Chile   0.6 China   2.5 Japan   1.5 Italy   3.6
Paraguay   2.5 Belgium   0.5 Germany   2.5 Mexico   1.4 France   3.0
France   2.3 Venezuela   0.5 Paraguay   2.4 Ecuador   1.2 Netherlands   2.6
Chile   2.2 Guatemala   0.4 Japan   2.3 United King.   1.1 Peru   2.3
Spain   2.1 Colombia   0.4 Iran   2.1 Spain   1.1 China   2.3
China   2.0 Switzerland   0.4 Bolivia   1.4 Chile   1.1 Mexico   2.2
Uruguay   1.6 France   0.4 Egypt   1.4 Netherlands   1.0 Spain   2.0
Mexico   1.6 Argentina   0.4 Venezuela   1.4 Italy   1.0 Belgium   2.0
7RWDO 71.7 7RWDO 95.1 7RWDO 72.9 7RWDO 81.2 7RWDO 77.6
,QGRQHVLD .RUHD 0DOD\VLD 3KLOLSSLQHV 7KDLODQG
Japan 22.9 United States 18.1 United States 20.2 United States 34.6 United States 20.1
United States 14.7 Japan 11.3 Singapore 18.9 Japan 15.8 Japan 15.2
Singapore 10.0 China 9.2 Japan 12.1 Singapore 6.4 Singapore 10.8
Korea 5.9 Hong Kong 7.7 Hong Kong 5.2 Netherlands 5.9 Hong Kong 5.3
China 4.3 Singapore 4.1 Netherlands 3.8 United  King. 5.0 Malaysia 3.5
Hong Kong 3.2 Germany 3.6 United  King. 3.6 Hong Kong 4.5 United King. 3.4
Germany 3.2 United King. 2.8 Thailand 3.6 Germany 3.9 China 3.3
Netherlands 2.8 Malaysia 2.8 Germany 2.9 Thailand 3.2 Netherlands 3.3
Australia 2.8 Indonesia 2.0 Korea 2.8 Malaysia 3.2 Germany 2.9
United  King. 2.5 Panama 1.8 China 2.6 Korea 1.9 Indonesia 1.8
Malaysia 2.5 Philippines 1.7 Australia 1.9 China 1.4 France 1.7
Spain 1.6 Australia 1.6 India 1.8 Canada 1.2 Australia 1.7
Italy 1.6 Thailand 1.6 Indonesia 1.5 France 1.0 Belgium 1.4
Thailand 1.6 Switzerland 1.3 Philippines 1.3 Australia 0.7 Korea 1.4
United Ar. E. 1.3 Netherlands 1.3 Belgium 1.1 United Ar. E. 0.5 United Ar. E. 1.2
7RWDO 80.9 7RWDO 70.9 7RWDO 83.3 7RWDO 89.2 7RWDO 77.0
Source: IMF, ’LUHFWLRQ￿RI￿7UDGH￿6WDWLVWLFV.








  manufactures -0.15 -0.15 -0.49
  raw materials -0.26 -0.35 -0.55
  food and agric. -0.39 -0.44 -0.51
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Mexico
  manufactures -0.02 -0.03 -0.06
  raw materials  0.15  0.19  0.26
  food and agric.  0.15  0.17  0.26
Source: OECD, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO￿7UDGH￿DQG￿&RPSHWLWLYHQHVV￿￿,QGLFDWRUV, various
issues.
(1) Terms of trade are calculated as the ratio of the price of exports to the price of





Competition in third markets Direct linkages
Countries (TradeShare i ) (DirectTrade i )
Total Manufactures Total Manufactures
:LWK￿UHVSHFW￿WR￿0H[LFR￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Argentina 0.25 0.37 0.94 0.61
Brazil 0.34 0.40 0.53 0.51
Chile 0.32 0.34 0.91 0.37
Venezuela 0.68 0.49 0.86 0.80
Indonesia 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.40
Korea 0.30 0.29 0.15 0.12
Malaysia 0.30 0.35 0.05 0.05
Philippines 0.55 0.58 0.54 0.78
Thailand 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.44
Canada 0.88 0.91 0.65 0.50
France 0.14 0.12 0.44 0.35
Germany 0.14 0.11 0.27 0.23
Italy 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.10
Japan 0.29 0.28 0.44 0.23
United Kingdom 0.18 0.15 0.61 0.39
United States 0.22 0.21 0.96 0.95
:LWK￿UHVSHFW￿WR￿7KDLODQG￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Argentina 0.38 0.31 0.86 0.56
Brazil 0.54 0.49 0.65 0.94
Chile 0.60 0.39 0.44 0.19
Mexico 0.31 0.33 0.98 0.96
Venezuela 0.25 0.33 0.21 0.21
Indonesia 0.74 0.82 0.96 0.99
Korea 0.66 0.71 0.62 0.37
Malaysia 0.78 0.80 1.00 0.98
Philippines 0.69 0.67 0.94 0.42
Canada 0.38 0.37 0.68 0.61
France 0.36 0.39 0.88 0.97
Germany 0.37 0.40 0.76 0.69
Italy 0.39 0.41 0.86 0.75
Japan 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.53
United Kingdom 0.44 0.46 0.83 0.90
United States 0.47 0.46 0.81 0.84
Source: our calculations on WTA Statistics Canada database.
(1) See Glick and Rose (1998) for the methodology. For the list of third




Destinations Industrial countries Developing and emerging countries
World EU USA Japan Latin Asia
Eastern
Europe,
Commodity groups America Russia, Turkey
$UJHQWLQD
Food    587.7    708.4    772.5    701.4    479.6    570.9   363.0 1152.6    749.4
Agricultural raw mat.    120.8    159.7    223.9      56.7    110.6    112.2   162.4     38.2      30.6
Ores and metals      48.1    102.2      44.1      71.3    429.9      29.1      46.1     24.6        4.4
Fuels    155.4    103.4        5.7     276.0        0.1    199.2    257.1     83.9        0.9
Manufactured goods      46.9      31.1      21.1       47.7        7.2      54.6      62.1     28.2      19.1
%UD]LO
Food    372.0    414.1    514.0    322.8    211.5    327.1   102.3   629.0    623.5
Agricultural raw mat.    164.2    219.5    223.8    253.3    164.9      96.8     70.9   211.9      23.5
Ores and metals    313.8    372.2    346.9    210.8    700.4    246.0   179.7   425.0    269.6
Fuels       8.4        6.1        4.9        8.9        0.0      12.1     19.2      0.2       2.8
Manufactured goods     71.8      59.0     40.7      89.0      41.5      88.4   108.2    52.6     29.0
&KLOH
Food   299.2   326.4    191.4    809.1    210.4   264.0   305.4   219.4    485.2
Agricultural raw mat.   433.6   451.9    356.0    529.5    308.7   414.1   226.0   511.4    380.9
Ores and metals 1548.3 1483.5 1720.8  1367.5    949.4 1726.0 1289.8 2067.6 1198.4
Fuels       4.0      1.2       0.0        4.0        0.1      8.7     17.4      0.1       0.0
Manufactured goods     19.4    10.4       9.7      17.3        4.5    32.3     55.0      4.1       6.1
0H[LFR
Food     74.2    70.6    148.7    115.3    133.0    87.5     58.7 137.3    148.2
Agricultural raw mat.     46.0     35.4      86.9      40.3      40.8   146.2     99.1 338.1    233.2
Ores and metals     61.5     56.4    289.0      64.0    211.3    70.5     92.3 51.2    346.4
Fuels   133.8    123.6    341.1    100.6    252.7   156.7   171.4 14.2      13.0
Manufactured goods   109.6    107.6      66.1     105.1      37.4   110.5   101.5 102.1      96.2
9HQH]XHOD
Food     29.6     16.1      45.8     20.8      99.9     62.2     60.4   75.6       0.0
Agricultural raw mat.      6.6       2.1      14.5      1.0        0.8     17.9     20.6   76.6       0.0
Ores and metals     73.4     63.2    178.6    66.5     658.1     98.5   119.9 327.5   844.6
Fuels 1109.5 1104.8 1103.2  984.8    112.7 1069.4 1023.3 615.7   715.3
Manufactured goods     16.2       9.1     21.7     7.4      50.0     32.7     30.8  55.6      5.3
Source: our calculations on WTA Statistics Canada database.
(1)  The index is computed as SI = (xikj / xkj) / (xiwj / xwj)*100, where the numerator is the export share of each




Destinations Industrial countries Developing and emerging countries
World EU USA Japan Latin Asia
Eastern
Europe,
Commodity groups America Russia, Turkey
,QGRQHVLD 128.2 122.2 158.1 195.1   64.8 139.4 153.5 171.6 321.9
Food 205.8 186.9 146.7 429.2   51.8 239.8 997.6 177.7 729.5
Agricultural raw mat. 144.1 152.4 186.7     1.0 139.5 131.7 225.5 113.1     0.0
Ores and metals 317.2 294.4   54.0   66.9 246.7 366.1   70.5 449.9     0.0
Fuels   60.5   59.7   71.5   78.0   54.6    62.1   50.2 52.7   47.2
Manufactured goods
.RUHD   23.1   37.7     5.0   15.5   78.0    10.1     3.8 16.1   17.5
Food   56.7   34.4   25.9   32.4   30.6    80.3   11.9 97.4   32.6
Agricultural raw mat.   36.0   22.9   13.2   15.0   30.9    53.9   15.3 64.8     9.4
Ores and metals   40.6   38.5     0.8     6.4   61.3    46.0     4.5 75.1   14.5
Fuels  105.0 120.0 129.3 121.9 130.3    93.6 121.8 106.7 135.4
Manufactured goods
0DOD\VLD 103.9   49.9   66.0   37.7   34.6 162.4   75.6 175.7 266.4
Food 198.5 197.9 256.6   67.5 185.3 206.7 455.2 140.3 596.5
Agricultural raw mat.   39.2   26.1   18.3   16.7   33.6   58.4     6.7 46.9     5.2
Ores and metals 108.2   92.6     3.5   13.8 144.6 134.1     0.3 153.9     0.1
Fuels 103.9 109.1 113.0 120.8 104.1 100.8 107.8 92.3   82.1
Manufactured goods
3KLOLSSLQHV   96.9   98.9   86.0 156.3   72.9   87.1   47.8 96.6 137.9
Food   44.2   40.8   81.7   16.7   25.8   52.4 310.3 37.6 111.8
Agricultural raw mat.   71.1   38.5     2.2     2.5   90.5 175.6   93.6 140.9     4.5
Ores and metals   16.1     6.1     0.2     0.6   10.5   47.8     0.0 52.7     0.0
Fuels   60.1   63.5   63.7   59.6   86.3   49.2   67.2 42.7   42.0
Manufactured goods
7KDLODQG 220.7 218.7 150.0 303.1 192.6 228.1 134.5 264.7 190.6
Food 181.5 177.5 132.1 125.9 181.5 191.4 249.0 165.2 405.4
Agricultural raw mat.   31.0   24.3   13.0   23.5   30.0   43.2     0.6 37.9     0.0
Ores and metals   31.4     4.3    0.2     0.5     4.4   73.9     1.2 91.4     0.0
Fuels   96.2   96.9 101.3 101.9 109.6   96.4 105.8 88.1   98.4
Manufactured goods
Source: our calculations on WTA Statistics Canada database.
(1) The index is computed as SI = (xikj / xkj) / (xiwj / xwj)*100, where the numerator is the export share of




















$UJHQWLQD 081 Feed for animals 8.5 8.4 ,QGRQHVLD 333 Crude petroleum 10.9 2.8
333 Crude petroleum 8.3 0.9 341 Gas 8.7 10.6
041 Wheat etc. 4.8 6.4 634 Veneers, plywood 8.0 26.1
044 Maize 4.4 8.9 851 Footwear 3.9 4.5
423 Vegetable oils 4.2 17.5 232 Natural rubber 3.4 25.4
424 Fixed vegetable oils 4.1 7.0 287 Base metal ores 3.4 9.7
611 Leather 4.0 5.6 931 Special transactions 3.3 1.0
011 Meat 3.5 2.0 842 Outer garments 3.0 2.9
781 Passenger vehicles 3.2 0.3 424 Fixed vegetable oils 2.7 10.0
222 Seeds 2.9 5.5 764 Telecom equip. 2.6 0.8
47.9 50.0
%UD]LO 281 Iron ore 5.6 33.1 .RUHD 776 Transistors 13.9 8.9
071 Coffee 5.5 17.1 781 Passenger vehicles 5.7 2.7
081 Feed for animals 5.3 11.7 653 Wov.man-made fabr. 4.8 16.8
061 Sugar and honey 3.3 12.3 764 Telecom equip. 4.8 3.8
851 Footwear 3.2 3.7 793 Ships,boats 4.0 13.6
784 Motor vehicles parts 2.9 1.2 752 Automatic data proc. 3.4 2.8
674 Iron, steel plates 2.8 2.1 999 Non-identified prod. 3.3 3.4
222 Seeds 2.8 10.9 778 Electr. machinery 3.0 4.6
684 Aluminium 2.8 3.3 674 Iron, steel plates 3.0 5.3
672 Iron, steel 2.8 13.1 583 Polymerization prod. 2.5 3.9
36.9 48.4
&KLOH 682 Copper 29.6 14.3 0DOD\VLD 776 Transistors 17.8 7.0
287 Base metals 13.2 12.0 764 Telecom equip. 8.7 4.2
057 Fruit, nuts 6.5 3.6 751 Office machines 6.5 4.8
251 Pulp-waste paper 5.6 4.2 424 Fixed vegetable oils 4.9 26.9
034 Fish, fresh, chilled 4.9 3.8 752 Automatic data proc. 4.6 2.2
081 Feed for animals 4.0 2.8 762 Radio receivers 4.1 14.4
971 Gold 2.5 1.6 333 Crude petroleum 3.8 1.5
248 Wood shaped 2.2 1.2 761 Television receivers 2.7 8.5
112 Alcoholic beverages 1.8 1.0 341 Gas 2.5 4.2
931 Special transactions 1.6 0.2 634 Veneers, plywood 2.5 12.0
72.0 58.1
0H[LFR 333 Crude petroleum 10.2 4.7 3KLOLSSLQHV 931 Special transactions 28.7 4.4
781 Passenger  vehicles 9.3 3.5 776 Transistors 15.3 1.5
773 Electr. equipment 4.6 13.7 752 Automatic data proc. 4.2 0.5
764 Telecom equip. 4.3 2.6 764 Telecom equip. 3.9 0.5
778 Electr. machinery 3.9 4.5 424 Fixed vegetable oils 3.1 4.5
761 Telev. Receivers 3.7 14.9 751 Office machines 3.1 0.6
782 Vehicles transp. goods 3.2 4.0 773 Electr. equipment 2.6 1.7
713 Engines 3.1 5.1 842 Outer garments 2.1 0.8
784 Motor vehicles parts 3.0 2.2 845 Outwear knit 2.0 1.0
752 Automatic data proc. 2.7 1.6 057 Fruit, nuts 1.9 1.3
48.0 67.0
9HQH]XHOD 333 Crude petroleum 52.0 5.6 7KDLODQG 752 Automatic data proc. 6.7 2.4
334 Petroleum products 27.4 6.3 776 Transistors 5.5 1.6
684 Aluminium 3.4 1.7 751 Office machines 5.4 2.9
674 Iron, steel plates 1.2 0.4 036 Crustaceans, molluscs 4.0 12.7
781 Passenger  vehicles 1.0 0.1 232 Natural rubber 3.9 32.0
672 Iron, steel 0.9 1.7 764 Telecom equip. 3.8 1.4
512 Alcohols 0.7 1.1 042 Rice 3.4 26.9
671 Pig iron 0.7 1.7 037 Fish prepared, pres. 3.0 17.8
516 Other organic chemicals 0.6 1.2 851 Footwear 2.6 3.2
583 Polymerization prod. 0.6 0.2 842 Outer garments 2.2 2.3
88.4 40.5
Source: our calculations on WTA Statistics Canada database.





Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Venezuela Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
2Q￿UDZ￿PDWHULDOV￿DW￿￿￿GLJLW￿6,7&￿OHYHOV￿LQ￿￿￿RI￿WRWDO￿UDZ￿PDWHULDOV￿H[SRUWV
Argentina … 34.8 21.1 35.1 21.5 36.6 24.1 34.8 31.4 31.4
Brazil … 21.3 19.1 6.0 16.3 17.0 13.8 22.9 25.8
Chile … 20.8 3.1 17.3 25.5 13.9 35.8 18.3
Mexico … 55.9 39.6 26.4 33.0 25.9 25.9
Venezuela … 32.9 35.1 25.6 10.2 10.8
Indonesia … 18.7 61.9 35.1 28.1
Korea, Rep. … 19.3 36.3 33.1




Argentina … 59.4 40.7 49.7 41.2 27.5 41.3 24.3 19.1 32.0
Brazil … 46.3 49.2 50.9 38.5 46.1 29.6 23.0 37.9
Chile … 36.7 44.1 37.4 33.5 26.5 23.0 32.8
Mexico … 32.7 40.5 52.8 46.0 47.1 56.7
Venezuela … 22.7 34.7 16.5 15.0 22.7
Indonesia … 42.9 38.9 42.4 51.5
Korea, Rep. … 58.5 53.9 60.0
Malaysia … 67.0 62.8
Philippines … 56.2
Thailand …..
Average (1) 46.2 49.5 37.5 54.0 34.1 38.3 53.0 42.4 38.7 50.9
Source: our calculations on WTA Statistics Canada database.
(1) Weighted average of manufactures similarity indexes with respect to the 81 partners listed in




(on manufactures at 3-digit SITC levels in % of total manufactures exports)
Countries Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Venezuela Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
([SRUW￿PDUNHW￿￿86$
Argentina … 35.5 26.6 23.2 23.7 15.5 19.8 17.6 13.5 15.3
Brazil … 25.9 31.9 34.0 30.7 23.3 18.3 13.8 21.5
Chile … 23.2 21.8 21.0 22.9 14.4 17.8 19.2
Mexico … 17.9 33.4 46.9 37.9 41.2 50.5
Venezuela …   8.6 12.7   5.5   7.0   8.5
Indonesia … 28.7 33.0 47.5 49.6
Korea, Rep. … 62.0 52.2 55.3




Argentina … 42.2 15.1 36.3 20.8 17.2 17.4 14.7 12.7 19.7
Brazil … 21.3 43.6 29.8 30.5 29.6 18.3 19.2 29.0
Chile … 13.2 44.9 11.7 8.8 8.8 6.9 10.4
Mexico … 17.6 27.1 39.6 31.5 29.7 38.6
Venezuela …   5.5   7.1   6.9   3.9   9.0
Indonesia … 28.2 23.7 31.0 42.2
Korea, Rep. … 54.9 42.7 53.6




Argentina … 22.6 21.7 20.2 22.2 11.5 12.6 12.7 6.1 11.8
Brazil … 31.5 15.0 31.3 18.4 27.9 13.6 9.2 16.1
Chile … 13.5 24.4 23.4 7.3 20.5 5.7   5.3
Mexico …   1.4 25.3 36.8 34.1 35.4 39.8
Venezuela …   2.0   1.6   2.9   1.8   3.3
Indonesia … 38.3 48.0 32.7 48.5
Korea, Rep. … 44.3 47.5 52.3
Malaysia … 47.3 55.4
Philippines … 48.1
Thailand …
Source: our calculations on WTA Statistics Canada database.39
$SSHQGL[￿,￿￿&RXQWULHV￿FRQVLGHUHG￿DV￿WKLUG￿PDUNHWV￿LQ￿*OLFN￿DQG￿5RVH￿LQGH[HV
      Algeria       Laos P. Dem. Rep.
      Argentina       Liberia
      Australia       Malaysia
      Austria       Malta
      Bangladesh       Mexico
      Belgium-Lux.       Morocco
      Bolivia       Myanmar
      Brazil       Neth. Antilles
      Brunei       Netherlands
      Cambodia       Nicaragua
      Canada       Nigeria
      Chile       Norway
      China       Pakistan
      Colombia       Panama
      Costa Rica       Paraguay
      Cuba       Peru
      Denmark       Philippines
      Dominican Rep.       Poland
      Ecuador       Portugal
      Egypt       Reunion
      El Salvador       Romania
      Finland       Saudi Arabia
      Fm Czechoslovakia       Singapore
      Fm USSR       South Africa
      Fm Yugoslavia       Spain
      France       St Kitts Nev.
      French Guiana       Suriname
      Germany       Sweden
      Greece       Switzerland
      Guadeloupe       Syrian Arab Rep.
      Guatemala       Taiwan
      Hong Kong       Thailand
      Hungary       Tunisia
      India       Turkey
      Indonesia       UK
      Iran       USA
      Ireland       United Arab Emirates
      Israel       Uruguay
      Italy       Venezuela
      Japan       Vietnam
      Korea Rp40
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